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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the external debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio
in the emerging countries has a power-law distribution. Such a distribution
reflects the fact that debt distress or debt crises are extreme events that
have been found to happen fairly often. We formally test the hypothesis of a
power-law, going further than the usual visual inspection of the distribution
of the variable of interest on a doubly logarithmic scale. We further show that
such a distribution can be derived from a theoretical model in which the debt
dynamics is explained by tax evasion and corruption. Using the framework
of an optimal stochastic growth model, we model the debt-to-fiscal revenue
ratio as a diffusion process for which the stochastic steady state distribution
is derived using the properties of Itoˆ diffusion processes.
Keywords: Power-law, stochastic growth, external debt, emerging
countries.
JEL Classification: C14, C51, C61
1. Introduction
External debt distress and episodes of foreign debt crises have been re-
current in the emerging countries history, at least since the beginning 1980s.
They have taken different forms: tightened restrictions on access to inter-
national capital markets, accumulation of large stocks of financial liabilities,
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debt restructuring, bailouts packages provided by the international finan-
cial organizations, debt rescheduling, delays in paying debt service, strong
increases in bond spreads, arrears of principal or interest on external obliga-
tions. The question regarding the policies designed to tackle sovereign debt
crises has given rise to a voluminous literature. The issue is not only the ways
out of debt distress episodes (cleaning up after the crises occur), but more
importantly how to lean against the wind (understand the chain of events
leading to external debt crises and try to act in a preventive way). In the
empirical literature, two approaches are usually explored.
A first branch of the literature on sovereign debt distress in the emerg-
ing economies attempts to identify those factors that are triggers of debt
crises and define threshold values on the driving variables that permit early
alert of debt stress outcomes. This literature builds upon a signal extraction
approach by looking at the behavior of different macroeconomic variables
that have been historically associated with debt crises: inflation, trade im-
balances, fiscal and monetary policies, financial stress, extreme episodes of
capital flows, etc. Debt crises have also often been associated with currency
and banking crises. This literature therefore explores the triggers of sovereign
debt crises and debt stress episodes using early warning models. The liter-
ature is massive and we refer the reader to some seminal papers by Berg
and Patillo (1999), Herrera and Garcia (1999), Kamin and Babson (1999),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) and to recent
contributions by Arellano (2008), Boonman and Kuper (2014), Manasse and
Roubini (2009), Savona and Vezzoli (2015).
A second branch of the literature examines over-indebtedness through in-
dicators of debt sustainability. The frequency of situations of debt distress
in the emerging countries has been explained by the snowball effect (high
interest rates above the economic growth rate), the original sin (countries
borrow in foreign currency), currency mismatch (the currency denomination
of the countries assets differ from that of their liabilities), the fiscal sin (fiscal
policy pro-cyclical bias), the initial stock of debt. Debt sustainability analy-
sis (DSA) has been developed as a way of getting insight into the probability
that external debt becomes unsustainable in the face of plausible shocks.
Probabilistic frameworks are therefore used to provide estimation of upper
and lower intervals of the future evolution of debt. The idea is to assess,
prospectively, which changes in policies should be undertaken today to pre-
vent the future occurrence of debt crises if adverse shocks were to happen.
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Here also the literature is massive. For recent contributions, we refer the
reader to the papers by Adler and Sosa (2013), Aguiar and Amador (2014),
Tanner and Samake (2008).
This paper proposes a new approach of debt distress or debt crises in the
emerging economies, based on the study of the distribution of external debts.
We investigate debt distress as changes in the ratio of external debt over fis-
cal revenue that are extreme or large (relative to normal situations), but not
rare. A situation of debt distress or debt crisis is defined by the probability
that the debt ratio jumps above a given threshold. We consider distributions
in the family of the so-called extreme values distribution (GEV) of Jenkinson
(1955), with a specific attention to distributions with a decay like a power
function rather than those with an exponential rate of decay. The reasons
are twofold. First, debt crises in the emerging countries have been found to
happen fairly often (they are not rare). Secondly, changes from normal to
abnormal debt situations do not necessarily occur abruptly. Indeed, unlike
in the developed countries, extreme debt events in the emerging countries
are not events occurring only under extraordinary economic events (shocks
hitting the economies or the financial systems implying a huge variance in
the data that disappear when the shocks are switched off). Conversely, the
sources of uncertainty causing changes in the ratio of external debts are en-
dogenous to the economic system, since the factors determining the dynamics
of debt in normal time are the same factors triggering debt stress episodes.
For both reasons, we need distributions whose tails decay more slowly than
those of Weibull or Gumpel distributions. We therefore consider distributions
in the basin of attraction of Fre´chet distributions. The candidate distribu-
tions being potentially large (Pareto, Cauchy, Student-t, ) we focus on a class
of distributions that we motivate theoretically : power-law functions.
After providing empirical evidence that the distributions of their external
debt-to-fiscal revenues ratio is represented by a power-law function, we pro-
pose a theoretical explanation of the occurrence of such a power-law. More
specifically, we develop a continuous time stochastic optimal growth model
where the dynamics of debt is described by a Itoˆ diffusion process. The
sources of uncertainty are intrinsic to the economic system and come from
both tax evasion (households only report a fraction of their income to the
fiscal administration) and corruption (a fraction of fiscal revenues is stolen
by corrupted bureaucrats). Fraud activity is risky because the households
can be caught with a given probability. Similarly, the fiscal administration
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faces a situation of uncertainty because the corrupted bureaucrats are not
known with certainty. It only has a suspicion that some of its civil servants
are corrupted. We examine the asymptotic behavior of our variables using
the concept of steady state in a stochastic sense. The steady state is defined
in terms of a probability density function which is shown to be a power-law.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 estab-
lishes empirical evidence that the external debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio has a
power-law distribution in the emerging countries. We go beyond the visual
inspection of a log-log graph of the distribution of the series, by estimating
the scale coefficient and by testing formerly the hypothesis of a power-law
distribution. Section 2 contains our theoretical model. Finally, Section 3
concludes.
2. Empirical power-laws in foreign debt-to-public revenue ratio
Let us look at the data in Figures 1 to 3. We plot the ratio of external
debt over public revenues for some major emerging countries. The data
are quarterly from 1980 (1990 for some countries) to 2014 and are taken
from Oxford Economics and national sources (central banks and statistical
institutes). Foreign debt data do not only comprise the general government’s
external debt but also include external debt issued by the private sector.
Public revenues data correspond to central and local government revenues
in local currency, including different types of taxes, interest receipts and
dividends from state owned enterprises. To compare them with the ratio of
external debt on GDP, these public revenues are then divided by nominal
GDP (at market prices, in local currency)
We show the non-parametric distribution of the ratio using both a Gaus-
sian and Epachenikov Kernel. The countries are shared over three regional
areas : Latin America, Asia and Europe. We see that many of the distribu-
tions have fat tails in their right side and do not seem to fit with a Normal
law. The probability of finding extreme values for the external debt ratio
is higher than for a Gaussian distribution. These extreme values reflect sit-
uations of external debt vulnerability, which may cause financial tensions
(rising interest rates, currency depreciation, capital outflows). To prevent
such situations, policymakers may seek to calculate the probability that the
debt ratio exceeds a certain value which is believed to correspond to episodes
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of debt stress or crises. A simpler way to proceed is to estimate a parametric
law that approximate the observed distributions. In what follows, we show
that the extreme values observed in Figures 1 to 3 follow power-law distri-
butions, more specifically Pareto type 1 distributions.
Formally, a continuous variable x obeys a power-law with parameter α if
its probability density function is written as
p(x) =
{
Cx−α, x ≥ xmin
0, x < xmin
, (1)
with the normalizing constant C = α−1
(xmin)−α+1
and xmin being the lower bound
of the power-law behavior.
The m-th order moment is given by
〈xm〉 =
∫ ∞
xmin
xmp(x)dx =
α− 1
α− 1−mx
m
min, m ≥ α− 1. (2)
For finite size samples, the central moments like the mean and the vari-
ance are not finite. Typical values for Pareto laws in economics are found for
α in the interval (2, 3) for which the variance and higher-order moments are
infinite.
2.1. Estimates of power-law based on bootstrap methods
We first estimate the lower bound xmin from which the data can be con-
sidered to follow a power-law. We follow Clauset and Newman (2009). For
a given xmin (assumed to be known), we compute the maximum likelihood
estimator of α :
αˆ = 1 + n
[ n∑
i=1
ln(
xi
xmin
)
]−1
, (3)
whose standard error is equal to αˆ−1√
n
+ O(1/n), with n being the number
of observed values being higher than xmin. αˆ corresponds to the shape pa-
rameter of the best fitting power-law, for this given value of xmin. Then, we
compute the distance between the CDFs of the empirical data and the best
fitting model (weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic) :
D∗(xmin) = max
x≥xmin
|S(x)− P (x)|√
P (x)(1− P (x)) , (4)
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where S(x) is the CDF of the data for the values higher than xmin, and P (x)
is the CDF of the power-law model that best fits the data for x ≥ xmin. Using
a grid of possible values for xmin, the ”optimal” xmin is finally computed so
as to make the distributions of the empirical data and of the best fitting
power-law as close as possible:
xˆmin = argmin
xmin
D∗(xmin). (5)
It minimizes D∗ on a range of possible values for xmin. The mean and
standard errors of the estimated parameters xˆmin and αˆ(xˆmin) are obtained
by a bootstrap procedure.
2.2. Regression-based approaches
The previous method is based on the assumption that a power-law can
fit the data well, which is not necessarily true. To evaluate whether a Pareto
law really fits the data, we proceed by using a rank-regression approach pro-
posed by Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011).
By OLS, we run the log-log rank-size regression (for γ = 0.5):
log(t− γ) = a− b log(Z(t)) ⇔ log(Rank − γ) = a− b log(Size), (6)
where t is the rank of the observations Z(t) (ranked in decreasing order). The
standard error of the shape coefficient b id
√
2
n
bˆ, with n the ”total” rank,
i.e. the number of observations higher than xmin (i.e. following a power-law).
Another way to compute this standard error is to estimate the opposite
regression:
log(Z(t)) = a2 − b2 log(t− γ), (7)
where the shape coefficient is obtained by 1
bˆ2
whose standard error is
√
2
n
1
bˆ2
.
One can plot log(t− 0.5) against log(Z(t)), as well as the straight line whose
equation we have estimated, such that we see if the data fits well with the
power-law on this log-log plot. Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) show that the
bias is optimally reduced for γ = 0.5.
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2.3. Evidence of Pareto laws in foreign debt data
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimates for our sample of countries. Graphs of
log-log plots of the estimates are not reported to save place but are available
upon request to authors. The estimates suggest that many of the distribu-
tions of the ratio of the external debt over public revenues can be approx-
imated by power-laws. The scale exponent lies between 2 and 4 which are
typical values for which power-law behaviors are usually observed. This has
several implications for the analysis of the emerging countries’ external debt.
xmin s.e. (bootstrap) α s.e. (bootstrap)
Chile 132,3 19,9 3,99 1,52
Mexico 336,7 45,7 3,48 0,63
Argentina 111,1 48,02 2,52 0,41
Venezuela 135,6 45,7 2,92 0,80
Brazil 31,2 12,3 2,43 0,42
China 34,2 17,7 2,32 0,45
India 20,04 17,62 1,59 0,07
Indonesia 114,4 43,1 2,09 0,19
South Korea 78,5 11,9 2,75 0,29
Malaysia 119,4 18,04 3,05 0,50
Thailand 157,2 17,4 3,56 0,47
Russia 73,8 17,4 2,82 0,38
Turkey 122,4 43,4 3,49 1,34
Poland 51,4 33,9 2,49 0,89
Czech Republic 103,6 20,7 3,68 0,79
Greece 260,5 63,4 2,81 1,49
South Africa 71,7 7,1 3,98 0,61
Table 1: Estimated lower bound xmin and associated α (bootstrap)
Firstly, the standard analysis of debt sustainability, that consists of ex-
amining how some economic shocks can make the debt ratio deviate from
their ”normal” levels, can be misleading. Indeed, with power-laws each new
event changes the central and higher moments of the distribution, so that
debt does not necessarily stabilize around an equilibrium value. It is better
to focus on finding critical levels around which the debt oscillates and from
which debt crises can occur.
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b (Reg 1) standard error 1/b (Reg 2) standard error
Chile 4,16 0,85 4,79 0,98
Mexico 3,33 0,51 3,7 0,57
Argentina 1,92 0,29 2,03 0,31
Venezuela 2,95 0,37 3,55 0,44
Brazil 1,81 0,31 2,37 0,40
China 1,97 0,26 2,43 0,32
India 1,04 0,12 1,43 0,17
Indonesia 1,84 0,22 2,14 0,25
South Korea 2,21 0,27 2,67 0,33
Malaysia 2,87 0,35 3,55 0,44
Thailand 2,77 0,34 2,89 0,35
Russia 2,22 0,34 2,28 0,35
Turkey 3,87 0,47 4,74 0,58
Poland 2,33 0,34 3,2 0,46
Czech Republic 3,18 0,50 3,8 0,60
Greece 3,13 0,65 5,32 1,11
South Africa 3,19 0,50 3,48 0,55
Table 2: Estimated α using rank-1/2 regression
11
Secondly, in powers-law distributions, extreme events are not rare. This
accords with the finding that some emerging countries have been found to be
”serial defaulters” on their foreign debt : if they have defaulted in the past,
they are very likely to default again in the future (the literature on serial
sovereign default is abundant. For a recent literature review, see Asonuma
(2016)).
3. Tax evasion and corruption as causes of power-laws in foreign
debt ratios: a theoretical model
What causes high external debt in the emerging countries? The literature
suggests that episodes of foreign debt distress have been systematically as-
sociated with other macroeconomic and financial imbalances, among which
hyper-inflation, banking crises, asset price bubbles, credit booms, capital
flows, the cyclical nature of fiscal and monetary policies (see Kaminsky and
Vegh (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2013)).
What is distinctive in our paper relative to previous works is that we
explain theoretically how outcomes of high external debt ratio depicted by a
power-law distribution can arise from loose civic capital or governance, cap-
tured by tax evasion and bureaucratic corruption in the fiscal administration.
Both these factors weaken a country’s fiscal position by contracting govern-
ment’s revenues. Public spending is therefore financed through a forcible
foreign borrowing. Since tax revenues accounts for the greatest part of pub-
lic revenues and given that interest receipts and dividends from state owned
enterprises are exogenous (in the sense that they do not directly depend upon
tax evasion and corruption behaviors), we focus on tax revenues as the de-
nominator of the external debt ratio. We propose a simple continuous time
stochastic growth model from which the exact asymptotic distribution of for-
eign debt-to-fiscal revenue ratio is obtained using results from the theory of
stochastic differential equations.
Two types of uncertainties are introduced into the model. First, we con-
sider lotteries on tax evasion and corruption behaviors which give us the
expected return to cheating for both households and bureaucrats, and the
risks of being a fraudulent and a corrupt government. Secondly, we consider
diffusion processes as follows.
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Consider a random variable X(t). Its change between time t and t + dt
is defined by the Itoˆ stochastic differential equation:
dX(t) = f(X(t))dt+ g(X(t)dZ. (8)
f and g are two continuous functions and Z is a Brownian motion : dZ ≈
N(0, dt) and dt is of infinitesimal order. Moreover, we assume that Z is
a Markovian process in the sense that dZ depends neither on t nor on its
past values. This assumption will allow us to use the general properties of
diffusion processes to derive a probability distribution for our main variable
of interest.
3.1. Production
We consider an open economy specialized in the production of a single
good. This good is the numeraire and its price is normalized to 1. The
country comprises N inhabitants (consumer/taxpayers and workers). All the
variables in the model are expressed in per-capita terms. The individuals
differ in their behaviors as taxpaypers (some are fraudulent, others are not),
but their consumption and production decisions are the same.
The single domestic good of the economy is produced with capital, labor
(fixed amount) and public spending
y(t) = k(t)βg(t)1−β, (9)
where y(t) is per-capita income, k(t) is private capital-labor ratio, g(t) is per-
capita productive public spending (infrastructure, public goods and services).
We assume constant returns to scale (0 < β < 1).
Domestic capital yields a stochastic return. The flow of private rate
of return on capital over the period (t, t + dt) is subject to a stochastic
disturbance:
dRk(t) = rkdt+ duk, (10)
where the drift component rk =
∂F
∂k
is a constant return to private capital
and the diffusion component duk is a Brownian motion.
3.2. Tax evasion
A consumer is faced with the decision of whether or not to pay taxes
on his actual income y(t). The income tax rate τ is constant. He hides
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a fraction e(t) of the income (0 < e(t) < 1). Therefore [1 − e(t)]y(t) is the
amount of reported income. The probability of being detected as a fraudulent
by the administration is p (0 < p < 1) and, if caught, the taxpayer pays
the due tax plus a penalty. b is the penalty rate on the amount of hidden
income. Therefore, the consumer pays τ [1 − e(t)]y(t) if he is not detected
and τy(t) + be(t)y(t) if he is caught. The return of each unit of concealed
income is described by the following lottery:
x =
{
1, w.p. 1− p
−b, w.p. p . (11)
The expected gain and risk of the lottery are defined by
x = (1− p)− pb, σ2 = E(x2)− E(x)2 = E(x2)− x¯2. (12)
x and σ2 are function of p and b.
3.3. Corruption and government’s choice
The tax administration consists of bureaucrats whose number is the same
as the consumer and a fraction p1 of whom are corrupted and a fraction 1−p1
who are non-corrupted (0 < p1 < 1)
3. Bureaucratic corruption arises when
civil servants charged with the responsibility for collecting taxes choose to
extort a fraction θ(t) of tax revenues. They steal a fraction of tax resources
which normally serves to finance public goods that enter as inputs in the
production activity.
A fraction p1θ(t) of tax revenues is stolen and converted to unproduc-
tive public spending (or public consumption). Per-capita public spending is
therefore described by
g(t) =
{
(1− p1θ(t))
[
τy(t) + be(t)y(t)
]
, w.p. p
(1− p1θ(t))τ(1− e(t))y(t), w.p. (1− p) , (13)
and the dynamics of productive public spending is given by the following
stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dg(t) = g¯(t)dt+ g˜(t)dW g, (14)
3The assumption that the number of bureaucrats equals those of consumers is made
for technical simplicity and does not change our arguments.
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where W g is a Brownian motion, g¯(t) is the expected productive public ex-
penditure from the above lottery and g˜2(t) = V(g(t)) = E(g(t)2) − E(g(t))2
is the variance of the lottery. Unproductive public spending (the share of
diverted tax revenues which we consider to be public consumption) is given
by
CG(t) =

0, w.p. (1− p1)
θ(t)
[
τy(t) + be(t)y(t)
]
, w.p. pp1
θ(t)τ(1− e(t))y(t), w.p. p1(1− p)
. (15)
The dynamics of public consumption is described by the following SDE
dCG(t) = C¯G(t)dt+ C˜G(t)dWC
G
, (16)
where WC
G
(t) is a Brownian motion and
C¯G(t) = E(CG(t)) = p1θ(t)y(t)
[
pbe(t) + pτe(t) + τ(1− e(t))
]
, (17)
C˜G
2
= V(CG(t)) = E(CG(t)2)− E(CG(t))2. (18)
In this stochastic framework, the balanced budget constraint describes
how the flow of tax revenues is assigned to the flows of productive and un-
productive public spending:
dT (t) =
[
g¯(t) + C¯G(t)
]
dt+ g˜dW g(t) + C˜GdWC
G
, (19)
where
C¯G(t) = p1θ(t)y(t)
[
pbe(t) + pτe(t) + τ(1− e(t))
]
(20)
p1θ(t) can be interpreted as a corruption index ranging from 0 (low corrup-
tion) to 1 (high corruption). It depends upon the proportion of corrupted
bureaucrats and the degree of prevarication in the use of public resources.
We assume that the bureaucrats’ punishment for being corrupt is nil. This
is a distinguishing feature of countries with poor governance (lack of trans-
parency and accountability, inefficient court systems). Moreover, it is as-
sumed that θ(t) > 0 in the sense that corruption is a rent seeking activity
that is privately beneficial, and that θ(t) < 1, because corruption inhibits
growth (by reducing the productivity of private capital) and the amount of
the rent. Therefore, the bureaucrats’ aim is to define an optimal degree of
prevarication (how much to steal) that maximizes public consumption.
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The government maximizes its intertemporal expected utility function
defined on public consumption subject to the constraint (19):
max
nG,nC
E
∫ +∞
0
1
γ
(T (t)nC(t))
γe−ρtdt, ρ > 0, −∞ < γ < 1, (21)
subject to
dT (t)
T (t)
= ψT (t)dt+ σwT (t)dw
T , T ∈ (0,∞), (22)
and
ng(t) + nC(t) = 1, (23)
where
ng(t) =
g¯(t)
T (t)
, nC(t) =
C¯G(t)
T (t)
, ψT (t) =
g¯(t)
T (t)
+
C¯G(t)
T (t)
, (24)
σ2wT (t) = n˜g(t)
2σ2W g(t) + n˜
2
C(t)σ
2
WCG
(t), (25)
n˜g(t) =
g˜(t)
T (t)
, n˜C(t) =
C˜G(t)
T (t)
. (26)
The solution to the maximization problem of the government gives an optimal
path of the share of public consumption out of total fiscal revenues defined
by (we omit the index t for purpose of simplification) 4
nˆC =
σ2W g +
√
σ4W g − 4(σ2WCG + σ2W g)(
ρ−γ
1−γ +
1
2
σ2
wT
γ)
2(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)
(27)
This solution illustrates the role of the relative aversion risk coefficient (1−
γ). When corruption takes place, there is a chance that lean times could occur
in the future. A bureaucrat could suffer from loss in his future consumption
because the outcome of diverting tax revenues is lower productive public
spending, lower production and thus lower tax base.
An interesting question is whether high risk averse bureaucrats (when γ
becomes more and more negative) are inclined to be less dishonest (which
could explain that high risk aversion reduces the critical level of corruption,
because being ”honest” today leaves more room for maneuver to be able to
4See Appendices A and C.
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steal more resources tomorrow), or whether they adopt a behavior suggesting
that ”a half a loaf is better than no loaf at all” (in this case, starting from an
initial value, we could expect the path of nˆC to decrease in time, because the
more they steal today, the less the possibility of diverting resources tomorrow
since the tax base decreases). It is easily seen that the sign of the derivative of
refnc with respect to γ is indeterminate so that both outcomes can happen.
3.4. The open economy and external debt
Insofar as tax evasion and corruption do not allow the domestic country
to produce the amount of the single domestic good that households would like
to consume, the country need to buy a foreign good from abroad. We adopt
the convention that imports of goods is equivalent to external borrowing,
so that external debt is defined as the domestic country’s net international
current account position. We make the following assumptions:
• PM is the price of imports and therefore 1/PM is a proxy of the terms
of trade. Import price changes are described by the following SDE:
dPM(t)
PM(t)
= pidt+ dP, (28)
where pi defines changes in the terms of trade and P is a Brownian
motion.
• Debt is denominated in terms of the foreign output and its price is
expressed in terms of the price of the numeraire PMD. The interest
rate paid on foreign debt is stochastic and described by
dRf (t) = rfdt+ duf , rf = i
∗ + pi and duf = dP. (29)
where rf is the real world interest rate assumed to be constant.
3.5. Consumer’s choice
The domestic country comprises agents who consume the domestic and
the imported goods. The agent bears domestic assets (he owns the firm) and
foreign liabilities (he pays back the foreign debt). His wealth constraint is
given by
W (t) = K(t)− PM(t)D(t), W ∈ (0,∞). (30)
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This implies
K(t)
W (t)
− P
M(t)D(t)
W (t)
= nK(t)− nf (t) = 1, (31)
where nK(t) and nf (t) are the shares of capital and foreign debt in total
wealth with 0 < nK(t) < 1.
The stochastic wealth accumulation equation is given by
dW (t) =
[
1− τ + x¯τe(t)]k(t)βg(t)1−βdt
−(CP (t) + PM(t)CM(t))dt
+σ
[
τe(t)k(t)βg(t)1−β
]
dWW
+k(t)dRk(t)− PM(t)D(t)dRf (t)
. (32)
This equation has several drift and diffusion components:
• Line 1 describes the drift component of the disposable income. The
household can inflate his disposable thanks to tax evasion activity.
Given (9), we have (1 − τ)k(t)βg(t)1−β = (1 − τ)y(t). This is the
disposable income when there is no tax evasion. e(t)τ(t)y(t) is the
amount of tax evaded. Since tax evasion is a risky activity, we need to
consider the expected return of tax evasion that is x¯e(t)τy(t) where x¯
is defined by (12).
• Line 2 defined the drift component of consumption, that is the house-
hold’s consumption of domestic and foreign goods that are assumed to
proceed at non-stochastic rates over the interval (t, t+ dt).
• Line 3 corresponds to the diffusion component of disposable income or
the risk associated to fiscal evasion. The standard error of the Brownian
motion WW is στe(t)y(t) where σ is defined by (12).
• Line 4 (first expression) k(t)dRk(t) describes both the deterministic
and the stochastic shocks to the productivity of private capital.
• Line 4 (second expression) PM(t)D(t)dRf (t) describes the influence of
the international financial markets and of the terms of trade shocks
which impact the interest rate paid on external debt.
The consumer’s objective is to choose his domestic and foreign consump-
tion, the amount of income to hide and his portfolio of net assets (assets
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minus liabilities) in order to maximize the expected value of discounted util-
ity subject to the constraint given by (C.2):
max
CP ,CM ,e,nK ,nf
= E
∫ +∞
0
1
µ
[
CP (t)ηCM(t)1−η
]µ
e−ρtdt, ρ > 0, − < µ < 1,
(33)
subject to
dW (t)
W (t)
= ψW (t)dt+ σzW (t)dz
W , nK(t)− nf (t) = 1, (34)
and W (0) = w0, where
ψW (t) =
[
1− τ + x¯τe(t)]nβk(t)n1−βg (t)( T (t)W (t))1−β − CPI(t)C(t)W +
nk(t)rk − (i∗ + pi)nf (t),
(35)
σzW dz
W = στe(t)nβk(t)n
1−β
g (t)(
T (t)
W (t)
)1−βdWW + nk(t)duk − nf (t)duf . (36)
nk(t) =
k(t)
W (t)
and nf (t) =
P (t)D(t)
W (t)
are respectively the share of capital and
foreign debt in total wealth5.
The optimal path is described by the following system of recursive equa-
tions6: 
C˜(t) = (δµ)
1
µ−1 (PM(t))
1−η
µ−1W (t)
e˜(t) =
x¯τ n˜k(t)
βng(t)1−β( T (t)W (t) )
1−β
(1−µ)
[
στn˜k(t)βng(t)1−β(
T (t)
W (t)
)1−βσ
WW
(t)
]2
n˜k(t) =
rk−(i∗+pi)+(1−µ)σWf (t)2+
√4
2(1−µ)(σ
Wk
(t)2+σ
Wf
(t)2)
n˜f (t) = n˜k(t)− 1
5Assuming the same rate of time preference for the government and the household is
made for simplicity and does not have any consequence on our results.
6See Appendices B and C.
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4 =
[
rk − i∗ − pi + (1− µ)σ2W f
]2
− 4(1− µ)(σ2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)
[
(1− µ)βσ2τ 2e˜2σ2WWn2y − β
[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜]ny]. (37)
From the first equation, we see that total private consumption (private
domestic goods plus imports) increases with wealth. Moreover, an increase
in import prices (deterioration of the terms of trade) raises the nominal
debt and accordingly reduces the nominal net wealth (since W (t) = K(t)−
PM(t)D(t)). In this case the households reduces his consumption (balance
sheet effect).
From the second equation of the system, it is seen that the incentive
for tax avoidance increases when the return on each unit of hidden income
increases relative to the risk of being caught (e˜(t) is an increasing function
of x¯/σ2). Moreover the taxpayer is more likely to cheat when per-capita
income y(t) decreases. This happens, either when private capital decreases
(the households holds less assets in his portfolio) or when corruption by bu-
reaucrats increases (in this case ng diminishes or, equivalently, nc increases).
Finally, T/W measures the implicit corruption and fraud tax on the house-
hold’s net wealth. Indeed, these illegal activities implies that the consumer
must borrow from abroad (in the form of imports) and therefore bears the
costs of the interest rate charged on external debt. This cost is internalized
by the consumer and has an inhibiting effect on tax fraud (we see that e˜ is
a decreasing function of the ratio T/W ).
From the third equation, we see that the capital share in total wealth
depends upon the following factors:
• rk − (i∗ + pi) is the expected net rate of return of capital (the capi-
tal owned as share of the domestic firm minus the capital borrowed
from abroad). It is proportional to the risks of both types of capital
(σWk(t)
2 + σW f (t)
2).
• the ratio σW f (t)2/(σWk(t)2 + σW f (t)2) captures the household’s de-
hedging behavior. When the risk of debt holding increases, the house-
hold want to own more domestic capital (which is possible by reducing
tax evasion).
• We have an additional term ∆1/2 that depends on e˜, W/T , nˆc.
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4. Power-law as steady state distribution for the external debt ratio
From Equation (30), the ratio of nominal external debt over nominal fiscal
revenues can be defined by
PM(t)D(t)
T (t)
=
K(t)
T (t)
− W (t)
T (t)
. (38)
For a given value of the capital/tax income, changes in the external debt/tax
revenues ratio are negatively correlated to those in W (t)/T (). Given the in-
variance properties of power-law distributions, for a given value of the ratio
K(t)/T (t), the existence of a Pareto law for W (t)/T (t) implies that the ex-
ternal debt ratio will also follow a Pareto law. Thus, we define the macroe-
conomic equilibrium in terms of the ratio of net wealth-to-tax revenues.
A power-law probability density function is derived by proceeding in sev-
eral steps. First, we specify the dynamics of the ratio W (t)/T (t) by using the
Itoˆ’s lemma. We thus obtain a Itoˆ stochastic differential equation formula-
tion. Then, a theorem of the existence of a stochastic steady state is proved
by using some properties of Markov chain diffusion processes. After that, we
show that the stochastic steady state can be defined by a power-law with
shape parameter depending upon our key variables of interest in the model
related to tax evasion and corruption. Finally, we propose some simulations
of the model.
4.1. Macroeconomic equilibrium as a diffusion process
Definition 4.1. Stochastic macroeconomic equilibrium
A stochastic macroeconomic equilibrium is defined as a path of wealth-
to-fiscal revenues ratio {λ(t)}, where
λ(t) =
{
W (t)
T (t)
}∞
t=0
, (39)
along which the agents’ choice (bureaucrats and households) are optimal and
the current account is balanced (imports are financed by foreign borrowing).
Theorem 4.1. The stochastic dynamics for the wealth-fiscal revenue ratio is
a diffusion process defined by the SDE
dλ(t) = Ω1(λ)dt+ Ω
1
2
2 (λ)dB, λ(t) =
W (t)
T (t)
∈ [0,∞], (40)
where
21
Ω1(λ) = λ
[
n˜2g(λ) + n˜
2
C(λ)− n˜g(λ)− n˜C(λ)+[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜(λ)]n˜y(λ)− CPI C˜W + nk(λ)rk − (i∗ + pi)nf (λ)],
Ω2(λ) = λ
2
[
n˜g(λ)
2 + n˜C(λ)
2 + σ2τ 2e(λ)2ny(λ)
2 + nk(λ)
2 + nf (λ)
2
]
.
Proof. We first write the bureaucrats’ and consumers’ constraints (Equa-
tions (22) and(34) which give us the separate dynamics of dT (t) and dW (t)):
dW(t) = W(t)
[
1-τ + x¯τe(λ)
]
ny(λ)− CPI CW + nk(λ)rk − (i∗ + pi)nf (λ)
]
dt
+W (t)
[
στe(λ)ny(λ)dW
W + nk(λ)duk − nf (λ)duf
]
,
dT(t) = T(t)
[
ng(λ) + nC(λ)
]
dt+ T (t)
[
n˜g(λ)dW
g(t) + n˜C(λ)dW
CG
]
.
To obtain the dynamics of the ratio λ(t) = W (t)/T (t), we use the Itoˆ’s
lemma.
Itoˆ’s lemma. Let X(t) in R2 be a diffusion process and F(X) a C2 map
from R2 to R, then
dF (X) = FxdX +
1
2
dX ′FxxdX, (41)
with Fx and Fxx representing, respectively, the matrix of partial derivatives
of F and the Hessian matrix.
We define X = (T,W )′, dX = (dT, dW )′, F (X) = W
T
,
Fx =
(
∂F
∂T
∂F
∂W
)
=
( −W
T 2
1
T
)
,
Fxx =
(
∂2F
∂T 2
∂2F
∂T∂W
∂2F
∂W∂T
∂2F
∂W 2
)
=
(
2W
T 3
−1
T 2−1
T 2
0
)
.
From (41) we obtain
d(
W
T
) =
−W
T 2
dT +
1
T
dW +
W
T 3
dT 2 − 1
T 2
dTdW. (42)
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We get the final form of Equation (40) by using the Levy characterization
of diffusion processes and by considering the following properties of Wiener
processes. Consider two Wiener processes wi and wj. We have:
(dwi)
2 = dt, < dt.dwi >= 0 ∀i 6= j, dt2 = 0.
For purpose of simplicity, we assume the following correlation structure
of two Wiener processes: d < wi, wj >= 0, where < wi, wj > is the quadratic
variation process for the components of the Wiener processes. 
4.2. Existence of a steady state distribution
The concept of steady state for diffusion processes is defined in a stochas-
tic sense. Instead of a point, λ(t) converges to a set of values in a basin of
attraction. Define λ∗ as the attractor. For any variable Z(λ) in the bassin
of attraction, there exists two real numbers  > 0 and δ > 0 such that:
d
(
z(λ), z(λ∗)
)
= inf
{
 > 0 : Pr
( |Z(λ)− Z(λ∗) |>  ≤ δ} .
The probability that Z(λ) is outside the ball of radius  centered at Z(λ∗)
is very small. This means that, once λ has reached its long-term attractor,
all the variables in the model which depend upon λ will also reach their own
basin of attraction. For Itoˆ diffusion processes, the properties of the values
in the basin of attraction of the variable of interest can be studied by con-
structing their distribution called the steady state distribution of the diffusion
process. The issue here is therefore to study the convergence in distribution
of the variable λ(t). To do this, we use the mathematical tools of the theory
of Markov chains to prove the existence and derive stationary probability
measures. The techniques are similar to those used in a few papers deal-
ing with continuous time stochastic growth models (see Bourguignon (1974),
Merton (1975), Chang and Maliaris (1987)).
4.2.1. Asymptotic stochastic solutions of Itoˆ diffusion processes
We first recall some mathematical properties of steady state distributions
of Itoˆ diffusion processes (see Feller (1952), Feller (1954), Ito and McKean
(1996)).
Let us consider the following SDE:
dx = a(x)dt+ b1/2(x)dz, dz ≈ N(0, dt), x ∈ [0,∞], (43)
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with a(·) and b(·) being continuous and differentiable functions of x.
Consider X(t) the solution of the SDE and define the transition proba-
bility as
P (x, t, x0, t0) = Pr
[
X(t) ≤ x ∣∣X(0) = x0].(44)
The probability density pi(x, t, x0) satisfies the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck
equation:
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[
b(x)pi(x, t, x0)
]− ∂
∂x
[
a(x)pi(x, t, x0)
]
=
∂pi(x, t, x0)
∂t
. (45)
The steady state density function, obtained by integrating (45), must satisfy
p(x) = c1m(x) + c2S(x), p(x) = lim
t→∞
pi(x, t, x0), (46)
where
M(x) ≡
∫ x
x0
m(u)du, S(x) ≡
∫ x
x0
s(u)du, (47)
with
m(x) ≡ exp
[
2J(x)
]
b(x)
, s(x) ≡ exp[− 2J(x)], J(x) ≡ ∫ x
x0
a(u)
b(u)
du. (48)
c1 and c2 are constants of integration ensuring that p(x) is a true probabil-
ity density. s(x), S(x) and m(x) are called, respectively, the scale density
function, the scale function and the speed density function of the stochastic
process.
Existence of steady state distribution. A time-invariant distribution
function P (x) exists if and only if
lim
x→ 0
x→∞
S(x) = ∓∞ and |M(x)| =
∫ ∞
0
m(u)du <∞. (49)
The existence of steady state distribution implies that the boundaries of the
process are inaccessible. A corollary is that, if the boundaries are inaccessible,
then pi(x, t, x0) converges towards a probability density function defined by
(46) with c2 = 0 (for rigorous proofs, see Feller (1952), Feller (1954), Ito and
McKean (1996)).
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4.2.2. A theorem of the existence of a steady state distribution for the wealth-
to-tax revenues ratio λ(t)
Now, we must prove that the boundaries 0 and +∞ are inaccessible for the
wealth-to-tax revenues ratio λ(t). To do that, several preliminary remarks
are in order.
First, λ(t) is the ratio of two variables W (t) and T (t). We assume that
T ∈ (0,+∞) and W ∈ (0,+∞). By assumption 0 is thus an inaccessible
boundary for W and T . This means that we do not consider the extreme
situation of balance of payment crisis with high indebtedness. T = W = 0
can figure out a situation in which corruption and tax evasion are so impor-
tant that this yields a depletion of tax revenues (T → 0). In this case, the
country reaches a high level of debt which reduces the household’s net wealth
to a low level (W → 0).
Second, the fact that by assumption, T and W do not reach the zero
boundary, does not mean that 0 is inaccessible for λ. Indeed,
lim
W→+∞
λ = +∞, lim
T→∞
λ = 0. (50)
Therefore to prove that 0 and +∞ inaccessible boundaries for λ, we must
prove that +∞ is an inaccessible boundary for both W and T .
Theorem 4.2. Let us consider the SDE of T and W in a compact form using
the Levy characterization
dT (t) = a1(T, λ
∗)dt+ b
1
2
1 ((T, λ
∗))dwT ,
where
a1(T, λ
∗) = T (t)
[
ng(λ
∗) + nC(λ∗)
]
= T (t)a(λ∗),
b1(T, λ
∗) = T 2(t)
[
n˜2g(λ
∗) + n˜2C(λ
∗)
]
= T 2(t)b(λ∗),
dW (t) = d1(W,λ
∗)dt+ h
1
2
1 ((W,λ
∗))dzW ,
where
d1(W,λ
∗) = W (t)
[[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜(λ∗)]n˜y(λ∗)− CPI C˜W +
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n˜k(λ
∗)rk − (i∗ + pi)n˜f (λ∗)
]
= W (t)d(λ∗),
h1(W,λ
∗) = W 2(t)
[
σ2τ 2e˜(λ∗)2n˜2y(λ
∗) + n˜2k(λ
∗) + n˜2f (λ
∗)
]
= W 2(t)h(λ∗).
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a steady state distribution for
the ratio of wealth-to-fiscal revenue are:
a) 2a(λ∗)− b(λ∗) < 0, and b) 2d(λ∗)− h(λ∗) < 0 (51)
Proof. i)
We first prove that lim
T→+∞
S(T, λ∗) = +∞
Using the Levy representation of the SDE of T , as given in the theorem,
we compute the scale density function of T (t) as
s(T, λ∗) = exp
{
−2
∫ T
T0
a1(u, λ
∗)
b1(u, λ∗)
du
}
, T0 = T (0), (52)
or
s(T, λ∗) = exp
{
−2a(u, λ
∗)
b(u, λ∗)
∫ T
T0
1
u
du
}
=
[ T
T0
]−2a(λ∗)
b(λ∗) , (53)
Then, we calculate the scale function
S(T, λ∗) =
∫ T
T0
s(u)du =
b(λ∗)(T0)
2a(λ∗)
b(λ∗)
−2a(λ∗) + b(λ∗)
{
[T ]
−2a(λ∗)+b(λ∗) − [T0]−2a(λ∗)+b(λ∗)
}
,
(54)
We see that
lim
T→+∞
S(T, λ∗) = +∞, if 2a(λ∗)− b(λ∗) < 0. (55)
ii)
Using a similar approach by considering the SDE of W(t), we get
lim
W→+∞
S(W,λ∗) = +∞, if 2d(λ∗)− h(λ∗) < 0 (56)

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Remark 1. Condition b) in(51) means that to avoid an infinite increase of
wealth, the risk-adjusted return of net wealth must be capped, which implies
that the risk-adjusted return of tax evasion and the marginal productivity of
capital should not exceed a threshold value, and that the cost of borrowing
abroad cannot be too low. Condition a) implies that the share of fiscal rev-
enues that is diverted is not infinite, if the risk-adjusted return of corruption
is capped.
4.3. Invariant density function for the external debt-to-fiscal revenues ratio
Theorem 4.3. Let f(λ) be the invariant steady-state density function of λ(t).
Assume that T > 0,W > 0 and that the conditions a) and b) of Theorem 4.2
hold. Then, f(λ) for the SDE of the wealth-to-fiscal revenues ratio
dλ(t) = Ω1(λ)dt+ Ω
1
2
2 (λ)dB(t),
Ω1 = K
∗
2λ = λ
[
n˜2g(λ) + n˜
2
C(λ)− n˜g(λ)− n˜C(λ) +
[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜(λ)]n˜y(λ)−
CPI C˜
W
+ n˜k(λ)rk − (i∗ + pi)n˜f (λ)
]
,
Ω2 = K
∗
3λ
2 = λ2
[
n˜2g(λ) + n˜
2
C(λ) + σ
2τ 2e˜2(λ)n˜2y(λ) + n˜
2
k(λ) + n˜
2
f (λ)
]
is
f(λ) = C0m(λ) =
1−2K
∗
2
K∗3
λ˜
(λ
λ˜
)
−2(1−K
∗
2
K∗3
)
= α−1
λ˜
(λ
λ˜
)−α,
α = 2(1 −K∗2/K∗3), λ˜ is an arbitrary λ defined as the lower bound from
which the power-law holds.
Proof.
We compute the speed density function as
m(λ) = exp(2J(λ))
Ω2(λ)
, J(λ) =
∫ λ
λ˜
Ω1(u)
Ω2(u)
du, (57)
We therefore get
C0m(λ) = C0
1
K∗3λ2
exp
[
2
∫ λ
λ˜
K∗2u
K∗3u2
du
]
= C0
1
K∗3λ2
exp
[
2
∫ λ
λ˜
K∗2
K∗3u
du
]
= C0
1
K∗3λ2
exp
[
2
K∗2
K∗3
ln(λ
λ˜
)
]
= C0
1
K∗3λ2
[
λ
λ˜
]2K∗2
K∗3
= C0λ˜
−2
K∗3
(λ
λ˜
)
−2(1−K
∗
2
K∗3
)
(58)
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This corresponds to a power-law with α = 2(1−K∗2/K∗3).
We then calculate the normalizing constant C0, such that
∫ +∞
λ˜
f(u)du =
1. This yields C0 = −λ˜(2K∗2 − K∗3). By replacing in the expression above,
we get f(λ).

The µth-order moment is given by
E(λµ) =
∫ +∞
λ˜
uµf(u)du =
α− 1
α− 1− µλ˜
µ. (59)
All moments, except the mean, diverge when 2 < α < 3. This means
that they do not converge as more observations are added to the sample and
that the distribution has time-varying tails.
In the expression of α, K∗2 and K
∗
3 refer respectively to the mean and
volatility of net wealth. The effect of a change in a parameter of the model
on the shape parameter thus depends upon a trade-off between the mean
level of wealth and its variability. One cannot exclude to have nonlinear
effects depending upon the respective response of the mean and variance
component of wealth to changes in the parameters. Rather than perform
analytical exercises, we do some simulations of the model.
4.4. Some simulations of the model
We now simulate the model to examine the impact of tax evasion and
corruption on the scale parameter α. Since the shape parameter is positive
(by definition of a power-law function), the ratio (K∗2/K
∗
3) varies in the in-
terval (−∞, 1). When (K∗2/K∗3) varies from −∞ to 1, α decreases, thereby
implying that the pdf of λ will tend to Pareto laws as the ratio diminishes.
This ratio can be interpreted as the combined net returns of illegal activi-
ties (fraud and corruption) relative to their risk. Since, we have seen that
net wealth and debt are negatively correlated, one can understand that, an
increase in the returns to illegal activity relative to their risk implies heavier
tails in the pdf of the external debt ratio and therefore a higher likelihood of
the occurrence of extreme debt events.
We first calibrate the model to have a benchmark situation (baseline sce-
nario). The macroeconomic variables are chosen in such a way to simulate
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an economy with some plausible macroeconomic characteristics of emerging
economies. The aggregate income is assumed to be 1000 billion dollars with
aggregate tax revenues of 400 billions. The share of tax revenues over total
wealth is 50%. The marginal productivity of capital is 5% and the interest
rate on external debt is 7%. Corrupt bureaucrats steal 30% of tax revenues,
tax evaders hide 10% of their income. The probability to be caught as a tax
fraudulent is one-half, the probability of being a corrupt bureaucrat is 0.5.
If they are caught, the consumer/tax evader must pay a penalty of 20% of
the hidden income. The values of the other parameters (variances, tax rate,
and the parameters computed from the calibrated variables) are given below
(see Table 3).
Shape parameter α = 2(1−K2/K3) 2,80
K2 -9,69 Characteristics of the Economy
K3 24,12 y aggregate revenue 1000
Fiscal evasion T aggregate tax revenue 400
e Share of the household’s concealed revenue 0,1 T/W share of tax revenue on aggregate wealth 0,5
x¯ E of the yield of a concealed unit of taxed revenue 0,4 C/W = nc ∗ T/W 0,10
Administration’s fight against fiscal evasion β coeff. of the production function (on k) 0,5
τ Tax rate 0,1 µ Arrow Prat coefficient -20
p Probability of being caught by the administration 0,5 CPI CPI index = P 1−η 100
b Fine HH has to pay if caught by the administration 0,2 rk interest rate on capital 0,05
g¯ E of taxes (legally collected) 249,0 rf = i ∗+pi (interest rate on external debt) 0,07
Corruption
theta θ Share of tax ceased by the corrupted government 0,3 ng gbar(t)/T 0,8
p1 Probability of the government to be corrupted 0,5 nc C
Gbar/T = 1− ng 0,2
Volatilities nK K/W given by n
β
k = ny/(ngT/W )
1−β 3,9
σ variance of the consumer’s lottery 0,6 nf PD/W = nK − 1 2,9
σWw variance on concealed revenue not ceased by the gvt 1 ny = y/W = yT/W/T 1,25
σWk variance of the growth of return to capital dRk 1 n
tilde
g 0,63
σWf variance of the growth of it on external debt dRf 1 n
tilde
c 0,16
Table 3: Calibration of the parameters for the computation of the shape parameter α
Note: in blue: coefficients or parameters fixed for the calibration
in orange: coefficients or parameters computed
Impact of fighting fiscal evasion on the shape parameter
Fighting against fiscal evasion reduces the frequency of extreme events
of external debt (see Figure 4). This happens for a higher probability p
of catching those consumers convinced of fraud, or a higher penalty rate b.
A corollary result is that tax avoidance have more negative repercussions
on foreign debt (with more heavy tails indicating more frequent extreme
events), if the evaders take advantage of favorable conditions: deficiencies of
administrative surveillance, opaque fiscal environment.
Meanwhile, as the figures suggest, a highly punitive system can create a
harmful situation in terms of debt. Indeed, the inverted bell curves (espe-
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cially for b) suggest that, above a given threshold, there may be a fiscal cost
for the government: the higher the penalty rate, the more consumers will try
to figure out ways to stop paying their income tax. Such a nonlinear effect
is in line with the literature suggesting that there is no compelling evidence
of how tax compliance is affected by punishment through more efficient tax
audits, or tax penalties (see Alm (2012), Murphy (2008), Slemrod (2007)).
The fact that a severe punishment may increase the way people behave
in not fulfilling their tax obligations (thereby implying here a higher foreign
debt level) has been motivated by different arguments. First, people do not
necessarily report their tax liabilities on the basis of legal obligations, but in
good faith according to what they believe to be correct. High penalty rate
can be though of as reflecting abusive transactions between the tax admin-
istration and tax payers, especially if government officials are known to be
corrupted (they respond to tax fraud by ratcheting up penalties). A second
explanation is more in line with our model. The penalty regime does affect
the taxpayer’s behavior. Here the tax evaders pays twice: a fixed penalty
of the evaded income plus an interest rate on debt (they internalize the ef-
fect of fraud on debt, because this reduces their net wealth). The fact that
they bear this additional interest rate cost should persuade the consumers
to limit their tax noncompliance below a certain level (if the amount of debt
service paid from foreign borrowing increases, their compliance rate is likely
to rise). In this context, attempts by the government to coerce and threaten
taxpayers into compliance through high penalty rates could undermine the
legitimacy of the tax administration’s authority.
Impact of corruption on the shape parameter
Figure 5 suggests that more corrupt bureaucrats (increase in p1) and a
higher tax diversion (increase in θ) imply a thiner tail on the pdf of λ (α
increases) and therefore more frequent extreme events for the external debt
ratio.
The negative harmful effects are, however, reversed when the share of
resources stolen becomes higher above a certain threshold. The humped
curve representing a nonlinear relationship between α and θ suggests that
tax diversion of tax resources can have de-stabilizing or stabilizing effects on
foreign indebtedness (stabilizing meaning a lower likelihood of adverse high
debt scenarios in the right-hand side of the pdf of the external debt ratio, that
is a decrease in α). An increase in θ biases the composition of spending by
30
Figure 4: Simulations: impact of changes in p, b on α
raising the share of unproductive spending relative to productive spending.
The country needs to borrow more from abroad and the mean net wealth
(expressed as share of total taxes) diminishes (portfolio-adjustment effect).
But, as θ takes higher values, the expected lifetime path of returns from
corruption becomes more decreasing (the bureaucrats exhaust rapidly their
corruption opportunity). This contributes to stabilize foreign borrowing.
5. Conclusion
Our intention in this paper has been to suggest that the emerging coun-
tries’ external debt ratio can well be described by power-law distributions,
and to close the gap between the empirical evidence and the theoretical
framework within which such power-law functions can be obtained analyti-
cally. We consider the role of corruption and tax evasion about which there
is still much to learn concerning their implications on the emerging countries’
debt crises or debt stress episodes.
Our claim that foreign debt ratio can be the outcome of Pareto laws is
obtained rigorously, by using econometric tests rather than simply plotting
log-log graphs of the presumed distributions of the data. This is important,
since a non-negligible amount of empirical papers estimates shape parameters
by assuming that the distribution is a Pareto law, while this assumption needs
to be tested formally.
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Figure 5: Simulations: impact of changes in θ, p1 on α
Our purpose was then to provide a simple illustration of how a corrupt
economy with tax evasion might explain this empirical observation. Our
model incorporates the essential features of emerging economies: foreign aid
and borrowing is often a substitute to domestic taxation, bureaucrats offi-
cially appointed to make tax audits are sometimes inclined to seek private
ways of using the collected tax rather than leaving them available for produc-
tive investment, the detection of illegal taxation activities by the governments
is not necessarily efficient. Though they are present in the model, for sake
of completeness, our analysis is not meant to consider the role of macroeco-
nomic shocks such as terms of trade, supply shocks, interest rates shock on
foreign debt. We prefer to focus on the role of endogenous uncertainty, mean-
ing that the tails of the Pareto law do not only depend upon the stochastic
components of the diffusion processes, but also on the probability of detect-
ing fraudulent people and their risk-taking behavior, on the probability of
facing a corrupt bureaucrat and on the risk-taking behavior of bureaucrats.
This paper could be extended by investigating other distributions that
are likely to characterize foreign debt, notably the family of upper incom-
plete Gamma distributions. Enriching the class of distributions for external
debt would help in the detection of early warning stress debt episodes in the
emerging countries.
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Appendix A. Government’s optimal choice
This appendix and the next ones present how the government’s and house-
hold’s optimal choices are calculated. The methodology is based on tech-
niques used in continuous time optimization models (see for instance Chang
(2004), Turnovsky (2000)).
The government’s choice is as follows:
max
C¯G(t)
= E
∫ +∞
0
1
γ
C¯G(t)γe−ρtdt (A.1)
subject to
dT (t) =
[ g¯(t)
T (t)
+
C¯G(t)
T (t)
]
T (t)dt+
[ g˜dW g(t)
T (t)
+
C˜GdWC
G
(t)
T (t)
]
T (t). (A.2)
This constraint can be expressed as:
dT (t)
T (t)
= ψTdt+ σwT dw
T , (A.3)
with
ψT = g¯(t)
T (t)
+ C¯
G(t)
T (t)
,
σwT dw
T = g˜dW
g(t)
T (t)
+ C˜
GdWC
G
(t)
T (t)
.
(A.4)
Let us define ng =
g¯(t)
T (t)
, nC =
C¯G(t)
T (t)
, n˜g =
g˜
T (t)
and n˜C =
C˜G
T (t)
. We then have:
ψT = ng + nC ,
σwT dw
T = n˜gdW
g(t) + n˜CdW
CG(t),
(A.5)
such that
σ2wT = n˜g
2σ2W g + n˜C
2σ2
WCG
. (A.6)
The program becomes
max
nG,nC
= E
∫ +∞
0
1
γ
(TnC)
γe−ρtdt (A.7)
subject to
dT (t)
T (t)
= ψTdt+ σwT dw
T ,
1 = ng + nC .
(A.8)
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The differential generator of the value function V(T,t) is defined by:
L
[
V (T, t)
] ≡ ∂V
∂t
+ ψTT
∂V
∂T
+
1
2
σ2wTT
2∂
2V
∂T 2
. (A.9)
We assume V to be of the following time separable form:
V (T, t) = e−ρtX(T ). (A.10)
And government choses nC and ng maximising the following Lagrangian:
Lagrangian = e−ρt 1
γ
(TnC)
γ + L
[
e−ρtX(T )
]
+ e−ρtλ(1− ng − nC).
(A.11)
The partial derivative with respect to nC is:
T γnγ−1C + TXT − T 2XTTσ2WCGnC = λ. (A.12)
The partial derivative with respect to ng is:
TXT − T 2XTTσ2W gng = λ. (A.13)
Putting these equations together with 1 = ng + nC leads to
T γnγ−1C = T
2XTT
[
σ2
WCG
nC − σ2W gng
]
, (A.14)
and
T γnγ−1C = T
2XTT
[
(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)nC − σ2W g
]
. (A.15)
Besides, the value function must satisfy the Bellman equation
max
nC ,ng
{
1
γ
e−ρt(TnC)γ + L
[
e−ρtX(T )
]}
= 0. (A.16)
To solve it, we substitute the optimized value of nC and ng to solve the
resulting equation in X(T):
1
γ
T γnˆC
γ − ρX(T ) + TXT + 12σ2wTT 2XTT = 0. (A.17)
We postulate X(T) of the form
X(T ) = δT γ, (A.18)
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with δ to be determined. This yields to
TXT = γX(T ),
T 2XTT = γ(γ − 1)X(T ). (A.19)
Using this, the Bellman equation becomes:
1
γ
T γnˆC
γ − ρX(T ) + γX(T ) + 1
2
σ2wT γ(γ − 1)X(T ) = 0. (A.20)
According to (A.15), (T nˆC)
γ is given by:
T γnγ−1C = T
2XTT
[
(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)nC − σ2W g
]
= γ(γ − 1)[(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)nC − σ2W g
]
X(T ).
(A.21)
We can substitute it in (A.20) and divide by X(T ):
(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)nˆC
2 − σ2W g nˆC +
ρ− γ
1− γ +
1
2
σ2wT γ = 0, (A.22)
which leads to the second-order differential equation with:
4 = σ4W g − 4(σ2WCG + σ2W g)(
ρ− γ
1− γ +
1
2
σ2wT γ). (A.23)
Solutions (if 4 is positive) are of the form
nˆC =
σ2W g ±
√4
2(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)
. (A.24)
With nˆC positive we have
nˆC =
σ2W g +
√
σ4W g − 4(σ2WCG + σ2W g)(
ρ−γ
1−γ +
1
2
σ2
wT
γ)
2(σ2
WCG
+ σ2W g)
. (A.25)
Appendix B. The consumer’s optimal choice
Government and households are assumed to have the same time prefer-
ence coefficient ρ). The objective function is
max
CP ,CM ,e,nK ,nf
= E
∫ +∞
0
1
µ
[
CP (t)ηCM(t)1−η
]µ
e−ρtdt. (B.1)
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The household maximizes the intertemporal utility function subject to
the constraints given by Equation (34), and with W (0) = w0.
We define the aggregate consumption C = CP (t)ηCM(t)1−η.
The consumer price index can be defined as CPI(t) = P P (t)ηP (t)1−η which
yields to CPI(t) = P (t)1−η, as the domestic good is the numeraire
We thus have:
dW (t)
W (t)
= ψWdt+ σzW dz
W , (B.2)
with
ψW =
[
1− τ + x¯τe(t)]nβkn1−βg ( TW )1−β − CPI(t)C(t)W + nkrk − (i∗ + pi)nf ,
σzW dz
W = στe(t)nβkn
1−β
g (
T
W
)1−βdWW (t) + nkduk − nfduf ,
(B.3)
where nk =
k
W
,ng =
g
T
and nf =
PD
W
( 0 < ni < 1 for i = k, g, f).
And we get
σ2zW = σ
2τ 2e(t)2n2βk n
2(1−β)
g (
T
W
)2(1−β)σ2WW + n
2
kσ
2
Wk + n
2
fσ
2
W f . (B.4)
The households’ decision is as follows:
max
C,e,nK ,nf
E
∫ +∞
0
1
µ
Cµe−ρtdt, 0 < µ < 1 (B.5)
subject to
dW (t)
W (t)
= ψWdt+ σzW dz
W , (B.6)
nK − nf = 1, (B.7)
W (0) = w0. (B.8)
Define V as the value function
V (W ) = max
C,e,nK ,nf
E
∫ +∞
0
1
µ
Cµe−ρtdt. (B.9)
Then, the optimal program satisfies the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation
ρV (W ) = max
C,e,nK ,nf
F˜ (C, e, nk, nf ) = max
C,e,nK
F (C, e, nk), (B.10)
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where
F (C, e, nk) =
1
µ
Cµ + V ′(W )WψW +
1
2
V ′′(W )W 2σ2zW . (B.11)
Using the fact that B.7 which implies nf = nK − 1, we get the following
necessary conditions:
∂F (.)
∂C
= Cµ−1 − CPIV ′(W ) = 0, (B.12)
∂F (.)
∂e
= x¯τnβkn
1−β
g (
T
W
)1−βWV ′(W )
+σ2τ 2e(t)n2βk n
2(1−β)
g ( TW )
2(1−β)σ2WWW
2V ′′(W ) = 0,
(B.13)
∂F (.)
∂nk
=
[
β
[
1− τ + x¯τe(t)]nβ−1k n1−βg ( TW )1−β + rk − (i∗ + pi)
]
WV ′(W )
+
[
βσ2τ 2e(t)2n2β−1k n
2(1−β)
g ( TW )
2(1−β)σ2WW + nkσ
2
Wk
+ (nk − 1)σ2W f
]
W 2V ′′(W ) = 0.
(B.14)
F has an extremum (C˜, e˜, n˜k) defined such as to verify the last three equa-
tions. From the first two variables we obtain:
C˜ = (CPIV ′(W ))
1
µ−1 , (B.15)
e˜ =
x¯τ n˜k
βn1−βg ( TW )
1−β
AR(W )(στn˜k
βn1−βg ( TW )
1−βσ
WW
)2
, (B.16)
withAR(W ) being the Arrow Prat relative risk coefficient defined byAR(W ) =
−WV ′′(W )
V ′(W ) .
Assuming V has the form V (W ) = δW µ, where δ is a constant, we get
AR(W ) = (1− µ) constant.
The third equation leads to
β
[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜]( T
W
)1−βWV ′(W )n1−βg n
β
k
+βσ2τ 2e˜2( T
W
)2(1−β)σ2WWW
2V ′′(W )n2(1−β)g n2βk
+
[
n2k(σ
2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)− nkσ2W f
]
W 2V ′′(W )
+
[
rk − (i∗ + pi)
]
WV ′(W )nk = 0.
(B.17)
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Define ny as the share of production over total wealth, that is ny =
Y
W
. We
then have n1−βg n
β
k(
T
W
)1−β = ny, which leads to rewrite the condition as follows
β
[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜]WV ′(W )ny
+βσ2τ 2e˜2σ2WWW
2V ′′(W )n2y
+n2k(σ
2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)W 2V ′′(W )
+nk
[[
rk − (i∗ + pi)
]
WV ′(W )− σ2
W f
W 2V ′′(W )
]
= 0,
(B.18)
or
(1− µ)(σ2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)n2k
+
[
− [rk − (i∗ + pi)]− (1− µ)σ2W f]nk
−β[1− τ + x¯τ e˜]ny + (1− µ)βσ2τ 2e˜2σ2WWn2y = 0. (B.19)
This is a second-order differential equation in nk. The discriminant is
4 =
[
rk − i∗ − pi + (1− µ)σ2W f
]2
−4(1− µ)(σ2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)
[
(1− µ)βσ2τ 2e˜2σ2WWn2y − β
[
1− τ + x¯τ e˜]ny].
(B.20)
Considering the solutions for 4 > 0, we obtain:
n1,2k =
rk − (i∗ + pi) + (1− µ)σ2W f ±
√4
2(1− µ)(σ2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)
. (B.21)
It is easy to see that among both solutions, the following one satisfies the
condition nk > 0:
nk =
rk − (i∗ + pi) + (1− µ)σ2W f +
√4
2(1− µ)(σ2
Wk
+ σ2
W f
)
. (B.22)
The household’s optimal choice is therefore described by the following
system : 
C˜ = (δµ)
1
µ−1P
1−η
µ−1W
e˜ =
x¯τ n˜k
βn1−βg ( TW )
1−β
(1−µ)(στn˜kβn1−βg ( TW )1−βσWW )2
nk =
rk−(i∗+pi)+(1−µ)σ2
Wf
+
√4
2(1−µ)(σ2
Wk
+σ2
Wf
)
nf = nk − 1
. (B.23)
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Appendix C. Transversality conditions
The agents’ choices must also satisfy the transversality condition. We
consider this condition for the consumer (the proof is similar for the govern-
ment).
For the constant elasticity utility function, the transversality condition is
given by:
lim
T→∞
E
[
W (T )µe−ρT
]
= 0. (C.1)
The stochastic differential equation in W is
dW (t) = ψWW (t)dt+ σzWW (t)dz
W (t). (C.2)
ψW (t) and σzW (t) (defined by Equations (35) and (36)) converge to constant
terms when when t→∞, so we omit t. We first compute the solution of C.2
for W (0) = w0 (initial condition of wealth), given.
We rewrite C.2 as follows
dW (t)
W (t)
= ψWdt+ σzW dz
W (t). (C.3)
Integrating this equation between 0 and t gives∫ t
0
dW (u)
W (u)
=
∫ t
0
ψW dt+
∫ t
0
σzW dz
W (t) = ψW t+ σzW z
W (t). (C.4)
We use Itoˆ’s formula:
df(t,W (t)) =
∂f(t,W (t))
∂t
dt+
∂f(t,W (t))
∂W
dW (t) +
1
2
∂2f(t,W (t))
∂W 2
(dW (t))2.
(C.5)
Taking f(t,W (t)) = f(W ) = ln(W ), we obtain
d ln(W (t)) =
dW (t)
W (t)
− 1
2
[dW (t)
W (t)
]2
. (C.6)
Since
[
dzW (t)
]2
= dt, dt2 = 0 and dzW (t).dt = 0, we have
[dW (t)
W (t)
]2
=
[
ψWdt+ σzW dz
W (t)
]2
= σ2zW dt. (C.7)
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Thus,
d ln(W (t)) =
dW (t)
W (t)
− σ
2
zW
2
dt. (C.8)
And integrating between 0 and t, we have
ln(W (t))− w0 =
∫ t
0
dW (u)
W (u)
− σ
2
zW
2
t. (C.9)
Replacing by the expression in C.4, we get
ln(W (t))
w0
+
σ2zW
2
t =
∫ t
0
dW (u)
W (u)
= ψW t+ σzW z
W (t), (C.10)
and thus
W (t) = w0 exp
[
(ψW − σ
2
zW
2
)t+ σzW z
W (t)
]
, (C.11)
which yields to
W (t)µ exp(−ρt) = wµ0 exp
[
(µψW − µσ
2
zW
2
− ρ)t+ µσzW zW (t)
]
. (C.12)
This is a geometric brownian motion. Assuming zW (t) is independent of w0,
one of the properties of such a motion is that,
E
[
W (t)µ exp(−ρt)] = E[wµ0 ] exp[(µψW − ρ)t]. (C.13)
In the end, the transversality condition can be rewritten as
lim
T→∞
E
[
wµ0
]
exp
[− (ρ− µψW )T ] = 0. (C.14)
This puts a lower bound on the rate of impatience ρ, since the above condition
is satisfied for ρ > µψW .
For the government, the transversality condition is obtained in a similar
way and implies that ρ > γψT with psiT is defined by Equation(24).
References
Adler, G., Sosa, S., 2013. External conditions and debt sustainability in Latin
America. IMF Working Papers 13/27, International Monetary Fund.
40
Aguiar, M., Amador, M., 2014. Sovereign debt. Elsevier, North-Holland,
Ch. 11, pp. 647–687, published in Handbook of International Economics,
edited by G. Gopinath, E. Helpman and K. Rogoff.
Alm, J., 2012. Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons
from theory, experiments, and field studies. International Tax and Public
Finance 19(1), 54–77.
Arellano, 2008. Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies.
American Economic Review 98, 690–712.
Asonuma, T., 2016. Serial sovereign defaults and debt restructurings. IMF
Working Papers 16/66, International Monetary Fund.
Berg, A., Patillo, C., 1999. Predicting currency crises:the indicators approach
and an alternative. Journal of International Money and Finance 18(4),
561–586.
Boonman, Tjeerd, J. J., Kuper, G., 2014. Currency crises in Mexico, 1990-
2009: an early warning system approach, 2014th Edition. Universidad de
Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mejico, Ch. Vol 2, pp. 34–51, published in
Nonlinear time series and finance, edited by S. Cornado-Ramirez, P.L.
Celso-Arellano, C.O. Trejo-Pech.
Bourguignon, F., 1974. A particular class of continuous time stochastic
growth model. Journal of Economic Theory 9(2), 141–158.
Chang, F.-R., 2004. Stochastic optimization in continuous time. Cambridge
University Press.
Chang, F.-R., Maliaris, A., 1987. Asymptotic growth under uncertainty. Ex-
istence and uniqueness. Review of Economic Studies 54(1), 169–174.
Ciarlone, A., Trebeschi, G., 2005. Designing an early warning system for debt
crises. Emerging Market Review 6, 376–395.
Clauset, Aaron, S. C. R., Newman, M., 2009. Power-law distributions in
empirical data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661–703.
Feller, W., 1952. The parabolic differential equation and the associated semi-
group of transformations. Annals of Mathematics 55, 468–519.
41
Feller, W., 1954. Diffusion processes in one dimension. Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society 97, 1–32.
Gabaix, X., Ibragimov, R., 2011. Rank-1/2: a simple way to improve OLS
estimation of tail exponents. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics
29(1), 24–39.
Herrera, S., Garcia, C., 1999. A user guide to an early warning system sys-
tem for macroeconomic vulnerability in Latin American countries. Policy
Research Working Paper 2233, World Bank.
Ito, K., McKean, H., 1996. Diffusion processes and their sample paths.
Springer Verlag.
Kamin, S., Babson, O., 1999. The contribution of domestic and external
factors to Latin American devaluation crises: anearly warning approach.
International Finance Discussion Paper 645, Board of governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., 1999. The twin crises: the causes of banking and
balance of payment problems. American Economic Review 89(3), 473–500.
Kaminsky, Graciela, R. C., Vegh, C., 2005. When it rains, it pours: procycli-
cal capital flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER, pp. 11–53, published
in HNBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, edited by Mark Gertler and
Kenneth Rogoff.
Manasse, P., Roubini, N., 2009. Rules of thumb for sovereign debt crises.
Journal of International Economics 78, 192–205.
Merton, R., 1975. An asymptotic theory of growth under uncertainty. Review
of Economic Studies 42, 375–393.
Murphy, K., 2008. Enforcing tax compliance: to punish or persuade? Eco-
nomic Analysis and Policy 138(1), 113–135.
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., 2008. This time is different: a panoramic view of
eight centuries of financial crises. NBER Working Papers 13882, NBER.
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., 2011. From financial crash to debt crisis. American
Economic Review 101(5), 1676–1706.
42
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., 2013. Banking crises: an equal opportunity menace.
Journal of Banking and Finance 37(11), 4557–4573.
Savona, R., Vezzoli, M., 2015. Fitting and forecasting sovereign defaults using
multiple risk signals. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 77(1),
66–92.
Slemrod, J., 2007. Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion. The
Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 25–48.
Tanner, E., Samake, I., 2008. Probabilistic sustainability of public debt: a
vector autoregression approach for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey. IMF Staff
Papers 55(1), 149–182.
Turnovsky, S., 2000. Methods of macroeconmic dynamics. MIT Press.
43
